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. EUROPEAN COMMISSION 
Communication of the Commission 
.  on a Community .participation in the debt relief initiative for 
highly indebted poor countries (HIPC) 
_The Highly Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) initiative was launched by the IMF and th~ 
·World Bank in September 1996 with the aim to help ·relieve: the debt burden of the 
poorest countries t~at make adjustment  efforts in a concerted way and are committed 
to  fight  poverty.  It represents  a  co-ordinated  effort  by  all. donors,  including ·in. 
particular multilatenll creditors. The initiative  co~ers' those poorest countries 'which 
are eligible for highly concessional assistance froth the WB and. the IMF; and whose 
.  debt burdens are deemed to be unsustainable after all other debt relief measures have 
been applied. 
,As a _major  partner of developing countries,  the  Community is. mainly  supporting 
. -development  through -grants.  Thu~, .it  is  ~nly a  small· multilateral. creditor. ·For 
. -instance, it will account for only about 2% of the latest total estimated cost of  the 
_  HIPC initiative, or roughly 4.3% of that of multilaterals-( 13.3 Billion US$).  ·.  -
From the outset, the Community has  strongly supported the. HIPC  initiative.  It~ has 
been fully participating in.it with regard to its. claims to e~igible ACP countries. It has 
·made a commitment to provide in due time debt-relief to all HIPC assistance eligible 
ACP countries ·as  laid.dowri in-the Gouncil decision ofJuly 61998. Furthermore, it . 
'has  -also attempted to address some specific' problems such as interim' relief through 
'  -
~ditional actions as a donor (annex 1). 
At the G-7 Cologne summit, Ministers agreed to an  'e~panded  ·ini~iativ~ that  will ' 
· provide faster, deeper and broader <;lebt relief (annex  ~). As a resu_It of the proposed 
enhancements, the totill costs of the Initiative ·are now expected to more tha~ double 
.  " .  - .  \  ~ .  .  \ 
to lJS$ 27 .4. bn-. > 
1 
..  ~  . .  . -·If adopting the ambitious targets set at the Cologne 07 Summit, some financ_ing  is 
still  needed in  order to  fully firiance  the  multilateral  share of the  enhanced IUPC 
initiative: 
Table 1: Financing needs for the HI  PC initiative (Billion US$) 
Institutions (exc. IMF)  Total  Already  Remaini  o/w. 
Financing  Identified  ng  short 
needs  term 
World Bank  5.1  2.0  3_.1  0.6 
AfDB  2.0  0.6  1.4  0.8 
laDB·  1.0  0.4  0.6  0.6 
Other  multi laterals  2.9  1.8  1.1  0.6 
(including EC) 
Total (including IMF)  13.3  6.2  '.2.6 
Sources:  'The Enhanced HJPC Framework: Financing  ,the World Bank's HI  PC Debt Relief', IDA,  August 
i6,I999, and manual update after the_.last Bretton Woods Institutions Annual meetings 
. There is. growing pressure exerted on multilateral institutions to internally mobilise 
the required funds enabling them to meet their contributio~s to the enhanced IUPC in . 
. order to reduce the bilateral financing gap.  F~r all Multilateral_Development Banks, 
the main l.imit to additional contributions is the fact that further ~internal funding from 
these institutions would be at the ~xpense of their aid progr.a~mes. As for the AIDB 
the exercise is almost impossible. 
Durin~ the last Annua!  meetings of the Bretton Woods Institutions in  Washington 
the Donor community took some far- reaching policy decisions which are expected 
to have' significant implications for the group of highly indebted poorest developing 
countries,  For the  first  time  a  close  relation  has  been  stressed  between  poverty· 
alleviation strategies, structural adjustment pro'grammes and a debt relief initiative. 
Both the IMF and the World Bank have been  put at the  heart of a  set of more 
coherent, effective and co-ordinated development instruments. The concessional ~ 
facility  for  the  poorest  countries  (ESAF)  has  been  re-focused  towards  fighting 
povert~ and transformed into ,a new Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PROF). 
New Poverty Reduction Strategy papers will be jointly prepare4 by the World Bank 
and the IMF. In  addition multilateral  and bilateral creditors announced significant 
- ' 
contributions to the financing of the HIPC Initiative (and to its special Trust Fund in 
particular).ln spite of those recent pledges, the level of bilateral contributions to the 
HIPC  Trust Fund  (1.4  billions)  remains  insufficient to cover the 2.6  short term 
remaining -financial gap.(table 2). Moreover, although rather limited (especially when 
. taking account -of the very low. US contribution to bilateral debt alleviation within the 
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enhanced HIPC framework), the US  administration pledge still needs the agreement 
of the us-congress, which is not secured. 
. Table 2: Bilateral support to the HIPC Trust Fund (Million US$) 
Conlr
0  Old  Recent  Total  Conl~  Old  Recent  -Total 
Pled&es  Pled&es  Pled&cs  Plcd&cs 
Australia  5  5  Luxembourg  I  I-
Belgium·  4  8  12  Netherlands  61  70  13/ 
Canada  27  , 27  Norway  , 41  41 
Denmark  26  26  Portugal  15  15 
France  21  21  Spain·  15  15 
Finland  14  14  Sweden  29  29 
Germany  27  54  81  Switzerland  28  28 
Greece  I  I  ·UK  36  135  50;  221 
Ireland,  '16  16  USA  650?  650 
'l~y  70  70 
Japan  10  10  Total  329  JJJ  754  1414 
Source:  'HJPC Initiative: Perspectives on the Current Framework and Options for Change·.  lf?A.  April 2,  /999,  with 
partial update .with information available to the Commission. 
During_  the  same  meeting,  and  following  an  'information  note'  from  the .. -
:Commission's services on a possible Community contribution to the enhanced-'HIPC, 
the Presidency of the European Council made the following statement: 
I  . 
"J'he EU is prepared to use funds in  the framework of existing EDF instruments for 
the purpose of making a substantial contribution towards attenuating the debt burden 
ofACP States. which are eligible for the-lllPC initiative·, and wiil approach the ACP··:  .:-..... ·· 
._.  ,., States with a positive proposal to that end.' The ·treatment of non-ACP States' should  ' 
'  (  .  . 
· be a fair one,  in  the  global.effort of the.intemational  Community.  This  initiative 
would inchide c.ontributions for.debt cancellation of the' order of magnitude  ~f one 
billion euros". 
.. The  proposai  of  the  . Commission; . which  follows:!'· on · the  , above-mentioned · 
.  .  . 
.  ,  , .,:  :·  ' 'information note'' is to be seen in this perspective.  ...: ......... ,·. 
I.-,  *  * 
3 The decision·adopted by the Council on 6 July 1998 ori a· proposal of the Com~ission 
confirmed the Community's ·full participation in the original initiative both as a donor 
and as a creditor:  1 
- as a donor, by making available supplementary resources under the 8th EDF structural 
.adjustment facility for countries  having reached their "decision point"; 
as a creditor, by using, iii the first place,  interest earned on EDF funds to deal directly 
(at the agreed level for multilateral donors) with the debt of countries having-reached 
·their "completion point" . 
· - A:s  those  two  dimensions did not concern  non  -ACP, HIPCs,  funding  (40  million 
. Ecus) was orily drawn from EDF.  .  .  .. 
The reduction in the eligibility ratio, -the  retroactive application of new criteria, the 
greater number of countries and the speeding-up of decision will increase the cost of 
. the  enhanced  initiative  in  such  a  way  that  the  interest  earn_ed .on  EDF  funds  or 
!  •  •  • 
possible reflows, as provided  f~r in the Council  Decision of July 1998  will  not be 
sufficient. 
The-overall  EU contribution  can  be  financed  mainly  with  non-allocated  gih- and 
previous EDE resources. However; in  view of the enhancement of the Initiative, the 
Commission  proposes  that  also  the  external  indebtedness· of non-ACP  HIPCs  be 
. addressed and supported with  budgetary resources.  As· regards  the  ACP countries, 
available EDF-based resources, which are in excess of.€ 1 bn, are derived as follows: 
.  ' 
co-operation with non-performing countries for which programmable resources· have 
' 
. not been allocated; some are  also the.  result of programming  ~y tranche-UJ1der:the 
revised Lome IV, which means that the second. tranche of programmable resources 
has not been· mobilised for a  imm~er  -of underperfonning coun'tries;  firiaily,  unused 
Stabex.funds may become available after the expiration of Lo'me IV ori 'February 29, 
1999. 
However, for any mobilisation of EDF resources, a decision.of the ACP-EC Council 
of Ministers will be needed, as the proposed Community action is outside the normal 
procedures of the Lome Convention. To prepare for such a decision,-a dialogue has to 
be opened in  the very near future  between the European Community and its ACP 
partners. Simil~ly, the use of funds from the General Budget to support the initiative 
for non-ACP countries  ~ill be implemented in  coherence with the Commission Co-
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- operation Strategies tow&rds them. The legal basis for the Community's aCtion will be  .  -
the  ALA  Regulation  n.  443 I 92  which  emphasises  a new  commitment towards 
poverty a:Ileviation  (art. 4) ·and Community's support to enable EU partner. countries 
·to overcome--macroeconomic and structural problems (art. 5)  .. 
*  * 
The Commission's proposal is based on three elements: 
Role ofthe Community as a creditor: 
For. all  multilateral creditors, it is impossible, at.this stage, to give definitive figures 
on their contribution to the initiative.)ildeed, some countries will only qualify, if they 
do, in 200f or later, and reliable analysis of their debt situation will only be available 
'  - .  . 
by  then.  Accordingly,  the  degree  of. future .  debt  alleviation  can  only  be  very 
approximately estimated for the totality of eligible countries (annex  ~)  . 
.  ·_  Going by ~urrent estimates and  setting them· against  a Community claimable debt, 
including  arrears~  in  the  order of €  1:3  bn  in  net  present  value,  the  cost. of the . 
.  .  .  '  . 
Community's contribution for p6tentially eligible countries would be in the-region of 
€550 Million (arinex 4  ),  out of which 40 MEUR. already secured by  the July  1998 
· decision, through ·interest. from formerEDFs. 
The mobilisation. of the required financing reaffiJ1!lS the strong political commitment 
by  the  Euro~an Corrimuniiy  to  the  Initiative.· These  resources  will, however  be 
.- . 
mobilised on a case-by-case b~sis, including with respect to the level of arrears to be 
taken into account, foUowing a favourable opinion of the EDF Committee, in such a 
way that each of the countries involved would, on reaching its "completion point", be 
able. to prepay part·ofits debt to the Corrimu.nity-on a Net  Present Value basis (annex 
•  ••  •  ~  •  •  ',  ,r  •  • 
5)._ 
Role of  the Community as a donor.: 
'  -
Over  and  above  this  amount;  which- corresponds  to  the  Community's  role  as  a 
creditor,  the· Commission  advocates  to· remain.· on  the  lines  defined  by  the  · 
. Community's involvement as a donor under the original HI.PC framework.· This refers 
to a bonus on· the structural adjustment support to eligible countries having· rea~hed 
. their "decision point", so that they have adequate financing for their macroeconomic . 
5 reforms, which in turn will facilitate their efforts to reach  their  .... completion point  ... 
(annex 1). The evaluation of the size of the borius should in the future also take into 
.  .  . 
account the beneficiary country's past track record in  servicing its debt towards the 
Community. 
Such a contribution would be in line with two key elements of the Cologne proposal:  · 
the need for adequate support to HIPCs during the  interim period, and the need to 
enhance the social content of.the whole exercise (annex 6). 
In the past, this additional support was financed by reallocations of funds within the 
· Structural  Adjustment  Facility  with  no  increase  in  the  overalJ  amount. ·  If this 
~nstrument is to be ~eployed extensively in the near future, bearing in mind the large 
number of countries  that  will  become eligible' for  the  initiative  over the  next 24 
months, there will not be a sufficient margin to cover the additional requirements of 
the countries concerned.  The Facility will thus have to be given· more resources.  An 
additional argument in favour of such an increase is that the next EDF is unlikely to 
enter into force before 2002  . 
. The Commission estimates that the Community's contribution to the HIPC initiative 
as  a  creditor  should  be  mirrored  by  an  increase,  as  a  donor,  to  the  tune  of 
€150 Million in the 8th EDF Structural Adjustment Facility. This amount will  also 
need to be mobilised from unallocated glh and previous EDF money. 
The additional SAF support will be mobilised on a case-by-case basis on top of the 
.  .  '  : 
structural adjustment programme whenever a country reaches its ... decision point  .... 
Role of  the Community as a major development stakeholder: 
As a major development partner, the Commission feel that, on top of its participation 
stricto sensu to the enh~ncement of the HIPC Initiative, the Community should make 
a contribution to the overall financing of the HIPC' initiative, and specifically to the 
HIPC Trust Fund. 
Such an  additional  contribution  would be  in  line  with  the Community support to 
. development in general.  This policy spans· from  the Community strategy to better 
integrate developing countries into the world trading system to its support for global 
debt alieviation and fighting poverty. 
6 
--
..  _.~_,  .........  ~ ... " 
....... 
',i. 
·; 
! ·I 
! 
j 
i 
I  •  I 
I 
l 
j 
I 
\ 
-' 
·- ..  '~. 
This participation, however, should be considered keeping in mind the need to ensure 
a minimum of fair burden sharing among stakeholders. The Comm_unity carinot, on its 
own, fu11y  finance the remaining gap; and other donors would have to play their fair 
.  .  . 
part in the financing of  the Initiative.  ~ 
Moreover,  it  would  make  sense  that  a  contribution  of ·this  kind. should  not  be 
exclusively funded from  unall_ocated  EDF resources.  It  sho~ld rather be seen  as  a 
. contribution t~  glo~al debt relief of the high.Iy indebted poorest cou_ntries,  ~hich also 
includes non-ACP countries. As such, it  should comprise an adequate mix of EDF 
'  .  . 
and appropriate complementary financing from the general budget, and contributions 
.  from a11  stakeholders it) an agreed EU context. 
.  ·.  .  . 
While preserving ·adequate funding for existing programmes, this funding  from  the · 
.  . 
general  budget  would  imply  a  redeployment . of  resources  within  the  financial 
envelope  . a11ocated  to  the  concerned  non-ACP  geographica]  co-operation 
pr~gramm~s,:covered by subsectio~ B7 (external action) ~f  the Community Budget. ·  . 
•  ·~  I 
The amount of  the Community contribution to the HIPC  Trus~ Fundcould be of an 
- . 
order of magnitude of 200 to 300 MEUR, depending on final decision's on fair burden 
sharing. 82% would be  f~nanced from unallocated EDF resources (annex 4); and the 
rest from the Community budget. Taking into aqcount the  geographical distribution  .  .  . 
_and  eligi~ility for debt relief of the countries concerned: the. approximate breakdown 
.  .  : 
over a period  of~three years  beginning In  1999 could be  15% from  chapter B?-31, . 
'Cooperation with, Latin American developing countries', and 3% from chapter 87~30, 
' 'Cooperation with-Asian developing countries'.  However the precise split remains to 
.be  determined,  including  in  the  course  of discussions· with  the  World  Bank  on 
modalities/ 
.  .  .  .  : 
The Community contribution to the HIPC Trust Fund would be earmarked: Resources 
originating from the EDF would be earmarked for the ACP countries, and in principle 
for the AtpB's claims on_  African HIPCs belonging_ to the group of ACP countries 
(with specific dispositions for.the sole non-African ACP: HIPC: Guyana). Resources 
originating from  the  budget would help financing  the reduction of ·Claims  towards 
Asian· or Latin American HIPCs. Specific sfispositions will  be taken to ensure that, 
·following  EU  financing  to  the  Multilateral  Debt  Relief  Initiative;  beneficiar:y 
.  .  '  . 
. countries will use further pomestic resources for social.sector development. 
7 The technical modalities of such a combined financing of a possible EU contribution 
.  . 
to the enhanced HIPC Initiative would have, of course, to qe  ~onsidered carefully in 
their  details.  In  particular,. specific  provisions  will  be  taken  to  ensure  adequate 
visibility, monitoring and financial control of the EU contribution to the Initiative in 
general and to the Trust Fund in particular. 
In a_nutshell, the Commission propo~_al is as follows: 
Contribution to the initiative as a creditor:  550MEUR 
Increase of the Structural Adjustment Facility:  150MEUR 
Contribution to the mPC Trust.Fund:  200-300 MEUR 
Total  900-1000 MEUR 
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ANNEXES 
to the 
: Communication from the Commission 
.  I 
on a Com·munity participation in the debt  r~lief initiative for 
highly indebted poor countries (HIPC) 
ANNEX 1 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COUNCIL D-ECISION OF 6 JULY 1998 
Eight ACP countries reached ·~decision point" in  1997 and 1998 and so are covered· by the 
Decisi_ori of 6 July l998.  Withthe new criteria all, rather than merely si_x  of them, should 
eventually qualify for debt alleviation.  ·  ·  -
Of these eight, only three have sQ.far reached "completion point" in the framework of the · 
_  HIPC inltiati~e: Uganda;. Guy~na and Mozambique.  Following the  financing  decision 
adopted by the Commission on 24 July .1998,  all  Uganda's remaining obligations in  the 
form. of special  loans· were. wiped  out  to the  tune  of ECUA 590 000.  A  financing 
proposal for Guyana will shortly go before the EDF Committee.  Natura1ly, in .both  ~ases 
an  ~dditional alleviation  will take  place  once  the  new .debt  alleviation  objectives  are 
. known.  Moz~bique  is a. trickier case because a lot of risk capital has to be paid upfront,, 
·something which poses a number of technical problems.· Since· the completion· point has 
"  :·only just been decid~d. the Commission proposes to wait a few .. weeks/months while the 
alleviation objectives are revamped so as to move straight into the finalised version of the' 
alleviation phm.  r 
Ever since it joined  the HIPC initiative the Commission has cpnsidered that simply fully 
meeting its commitments as creditor was not suffiCient· in  view of the scale of th~. ACP 
countries'. del?t  problem.  ·Hence its deeision  to readjust the share-out of the structural  · 
adjustment facility (SAF) and_ raise the HIPC allocations during the interim period by • 
·15% (or -by  .10%  for countries ·already enjoying. a 15% bonus  in  the  form  of re·gional 
integration· support)~  Annex  3  shows that  a good many countries  wili:gain.from this. 
measure i~ their 1999  .. 2000 allbcations..  '  .  .  . 
_ Note that this Community initiative anticipated the  G7's call for support to the  HIPC 
initiative at the ·beginning of the interim period, as ·well  as  its intention: to enhan(£  the 
•'  .  \  .  .  .  .  .  . 
social content ofthe.process linked to-the initiative (see Annex 6). ·  · · ·  ·  ·  ' 
9 ANNEX2 
THE MAIN FEATURES OF THE ENHANCED INITIATIVE 
Following a series of initiatives taken by a number of member States, the G7 meeting at 
Cologne in early June this year decided to facilitate and reinforce the  highly  indebted 
poor countries' access t~ the ~C  initiative.  ·  ·  , 
'  .  . 
The proposals made at Cologne, which have since been endorsed by the Bretton Woods 
institutions, have· three main planks, which can  be  summed up  by  the  slogan  "deeper, 
broader and  faster". 
• · "Deeper" debt alleviation: 
.  . 
*  reduce the NPY debt-to-export qualification ratio from 200-250% to 150%; 
*  make the access conditions for the "fiscal window" more flexible by lowering 
"the qualifying thresholds concerning the openness of the beneficiary economies . 
and revenue as a proportion of GDP
1
; 
*  retroactive application of these new criteria to countries which already reached 
their 'decision/completion points'' so that they are not  penalised for having met 
the conditions more quickly; 
*  fix  final debt reduction objectives when'the decision point is reached, namely 
when it is  decid~d that a country qualifies (with no possibility of revision, as 
hitherto, at completion point, i.e.  when it is acknowledged that a country has 
met  the  conditions  laid  down  arid  creditors  actually  start  to  reduce .  the 
country's stock of debt), meaning that an  increase in  GOP or exports will  not 
penalise the beneficiary. 
•  "Broader" coverage of the initiative: . 
*  thanks to these changes the humber of the  41  IllPCs that should ultimately 
qualify for the initiative should ·rise  from  26 to 33, and even  36 if Liberia, 
Sudan and Somalia are included.  · 
' 
•  "Faster" relief: 
*  the  int~mational· financial  institutions  (IFis)  and  other  multilaterals  that  so 
desire, will provide debt servicing relief during the interim period, i.e. between 
the decision and completion poirits; 
*  the completion point will become floating in  ~he sense that the countries will 
enjoy  a  final  alleviation  of their  debt  as  soon  as  they  have  met  all  the  .  ' 
conditions set, even if they do so before the three years hitherto laid down as 
interim period. 
To benefit. from the "fiscal window", namely qualify even when the net present value of the debt is less 
·  than  150%. of exports,  it  is  now  enough that  the  NPV. debt-to-revenue ratio is  over 250%  (against 
280%  previously),  that  exports--account  for  only  30%  of GOP  (against  40%  previously)  and ·that 
·revenue exceeds 15% of  this sa!'Tle GOP (against 20% previously). 
10 
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ANNEX3: 
LIST OF POTENTIALLY ELIGIBLE COUNTRI~S 
Decision point reached in 1997 
Benin, Bolivia Burkina Faso; Guyana;. Ugat:tda 
Decision point reached in 1998 
Cote d'Ivoire, Mali, Mozambique, Senegal. 
Decision-point expected in 1999  .  . 
· ·Chad; E~hiopia, Ghana, Guinea,  Honduras~ Laos, Malawi, Mauritania, Nicaragua, Niger,· 
Tanzania; :rogo, Zambia.  ' ·  ·  ·  · ·  ·  · 
Decision point expected in 2000 
Cameroon, Congo, Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar, Rwanda, Sierra Leone. 
DeciSion point expected in 2001 or later 
CAR, Bunmdi, Myanmar,,Sao Tome & Principe, DRC, Liberia, Somalia, Sudan. 
.  '  '  .  '  .  - ',  ~ 
ANNEXE4 
METHOD OF CALCULATI.NG THE COMMUNITY'S CONTRIBUTION 
Tq be able to deduce the level of the Community contribution from  w.hat  Is set out in 
_ Annexes 3 .and 5. we would need a reliabl¢ estimate ofthe percentages of debt reduction 
. that will be decided.  But this is impossible as we are in a period. of transition.  . 
. •  In the case. of countries that have already reached the decision point qualifying them 
\  for debt alleviation,. we need to update the figures calcubtted earlier in' the light  of the 
new Cologne principles and this can be done_ only roughly.
2
- .  ,  - :.  ·  ·.  . · 
. •  ·Th_e  data available  for other eligible  but ~not yet  qualified countries are-even  more 
.unsatisfactory since we do not have any good estimate.of the economiCratios•and·We" 
. do not know the discount rate that will be used for calculating the net present value .. 
·We therefore c:ann.of. clai·m to.give anything but rough  estima~es and a large m~rgin· 
, of error·: must~  be allowed for.  The Bretton .Woods institutions have tried:  They' have 
.calculated that the total cost of the· initiative will rise'from USD 6.2 billion to 13.3 bilfi'on 
for. ali ·the  multilateral  creditors,  meaning that  the :pri-nciples ··adopted  at ·Cologne  will 
.more or less dQuble its cost.  ·  ·  ·  ·  · 
The  table  below,  drawn  up  on  the  basis  of ·current' estimates,· gives  a  geographical 
·breakdown of  this total. 
2  In principle the .cost of. participation in the initiative is henceforth fixed at the decision point on·  the 
basis of  current economic data.  Bunhe way- in which the criteria are to be applied- retroactixely to the 
· countries  that  _l'iave  already  reacheq  it  js  not  cle.ar,  '  Will  account  be, taken  of the  evolution  of 
macroeconomic ratios  and data - exports, earnings. GDP and. abo-ve all, discount rates'- or will  the 
new nitios be mechanidllly applied to the original data? 
11 Table 3: geographical breakdown of the total cost (%) 
ACP 
% ofthe total cost, all HIPCs 
86 
% of total cost, all HIPCs except SSL 
113 
of  which: non- SSL ACP 
o.fwhich: non-AfricanACP 
ALAT 
62 
I 
II 
82-
2 
15 
Asia  2  .3 
· Source: World Bank 
In  the particular case of the Community, note that the "European" claimable debt is· of 
three t)rpes: special loans, risk capital and loans on EIB own resources.  When it.comes to 
participation in the HIPC  initiativ~. the Community will assuine the two former types of 
debt and the-Em the third (the Bank having accepted the Council's request contained in 
· the Decision of 6 July 1998).  The respective responsibilities· are thus clearly id~ntified~ · 
The problem arises from the fact that it is technically not possible either to make direct 
use of the Bretton Woods estimates3 or to  make country-by-country estimates, however 
approximate. 
4 
· 
In· view of these constraints, a pragmatic approach ha,d to be adopted.  It was decided to 
apply, on the basis of figures supplied by the EIB (which gives the schedules and thus the 
-.  net  present values  of each  of the  special  loans  and  risk  capital  operations)  the  least 
unfavourable reduction  percentage available, namely the one derived from  the  average 
estimates of the Bretton Woods institutions. 
In the preliminary document provided by these institutions,
5 the figure put forward for the 
European participation is USD 731 million in  1998 terms.  This figure represents 41% of 
the  n~t present .value  of the  ACP debt  to  the  Community and  EIB  including  ah-ears 
(USD 1.8 billion). In relative terms, this order of magnitude matcheS the increase in  the 
total cost of the initiative to multilaterals.- a 20% average reduction of debt was used as a 
working hypothesis in the earlier re.port (1998) on the Community's participation in  the 
· initiative. 
3 
4 
Not only d~ they not distinguish between the different types of European claims referred to above but 
also. their estimate· of the  net  present  value  is  altogether  excessive  in -the  light  of the  information 
available to us.  Furthermore, using the Bretton Woods estimates means adopting dollar calculations 
and the Commission has always made clear that it works only in euros and that in  the framework of its 
participation  in  the  initiative  it  would  be  bound  only  by  NPV  percentage  reduct~ons (not  units). 
Indeed, the  mairt  cause of the difference between  the  Bretton  Woods figures  and  those of the  EIB 
would appear to sterri from the CJ!.change rates used. 
The World  Bank,  which  centralises  the  information  gathered  under  the  HIPC  initiative,  has  such 
estimates.  With. them  it  established  a  matrix  of reduction  coefficients.  on  the  basis  of which  it 
calculated the debt reductions for each of the potentially eligible countries.  It did not, however, want 
to publish this matrix or any· table that would enable deductions to be made on the grounds that it could 
give rise to false hopes and give mere estimates too official a status.  If  the Commission were to try to 
gather the information to make its own estimates, it would be faced with the same problem. 
s  · Preli~inary costing -for individual MDBs-EIB/EU, MOBs meeting, Friday June 25  19~?· 
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About including arrears in the claimable basis, it is worth recalling that the application of 
the  rules  has  been  relaxed.  In  the  past,  the  treatment of arrears  to  multilaterais  in  the  . 
con~ext of the HIPC Initiative had been  guided by  the  principle of clearing all  arrears 
before a HIPC could become eligible for assistance under the initiative (at the dec-ision 
point) so  that  it  would enable all  cionors  to  take  part  in  the  qebt  relief action6.  This 
remains true: the final settlement of actual debt relief will not be decided until all arrears 
are  cleared towards  all  multilateral creditors.  However,  the  estimates provided by  the 
World Bank now include arrears in the base for calculating the reduction ratio by treating 
them as  part of the regular debt. On this issue, there has been an  understanding reached 
Jogether with all  multilaterals taking part in  the Initiative, and which  was reconfirmed 
during the October 1st Multilateral Development Banks meeting in Waspington. 
According to IEIB figures (s"ee table 4 below), at 31  December 1998 the NPV at 4."5°)~ 
.of the specialloans.and risk capital covered by the initiative stood at ~i209 million 
excluding arrears and at €R340 million including ~rrears.  By applying the rates of 
41% to this last amoumt, we obtain €549 million (or €516 millionexcluding Sudan, 
Somalia and Liberia). · In view of the margin of error induced by the estimation · 
methodology we iased
7
,  even  if Sudan, Somalia _and  Liberia are very a.miikely  to 
benefit from  tine  anitiative,  it would  be  preferable to  s~cure a  sufficient security · 
margin and take a conserrvative figure of  around €550 million
8
•  · 
."  This figure includes a~ estimate of what our contribution would be to the debt alleviatiori 
of Somalia, Sudan and Liberia, plus countries with  ~hich the Community has suspended 
cooperation. from the methodological point of-view, note that all the figures cited above . 
were  calculated  at  3,1 December  1998.  1!1  other  words,  the 'sums. reimbursed  by  the 
HIPCs up to the start of debt alleviation will have to be,deducted. 
_6 
7 
-8-
So :far  the Con:ununity,  which  is  treated  as  a preferred  creditor,  has  always  strictly ·adhered  to  this 
principle in its assistance to third countries, and the assistance provided under the HIPC framework has 
not called for an exceptional treatment to date (Uga!)da  being the only ACP country having received 
Community debt relief assistance and having no arrears to the Community).  -
- . 
Applying to  the EIB  database the -"European' average reduction rate  derived from  the  World  Bank 
estimates, on top Of above mentioned quality  problems,· is  definitely a  'second best'. First there are 
great differences in the geographical breakdown of loans on owry res-ources', on the one hand (fewer in  . 
number and concentrated in a small group of  countries), and special loans and risk capital, on the other. 
One·ofthe EIB's main debtors in terms of loans on own resources is Cote d'Ivoire~ and in its case the 
. -debt reduction  will_ be  well  below average.  Therefore the  use qf the  ''European~· average rate  (i:e. 
including the EI,B)  for all claims relating to  special  loans and  risk capital tends to  underestimate 'the 
debt reduction necessary under the initiative.  Moreover, the data supplied by the EIB gives  t~e NPV at 
31 December 1998, which means that all new disbursements after this date but before the  c'ut~off date-
fixed  for  calculating the  NPV at decision  point  will  have  to  be  added.  But  while  these  first  two ... 
elements tend to lead to underestimates, the choice of a discount rate appropriate to what would be the 
reference rate for a decision point at end 1998 (4.S%) would overestimate the NPV of the Community 
__ debt.  For countries that have alreaqy reached their decision point the reference discount rate is in fact 
higher, and the NPV thus lower.  If  the upwards trend-in interest rates continues, the same will  apply 
for countries qualifying in 2000 or after.  Added to this, disbursements that continue to _be  made under 
, the drawing rights have to be taken into account,' as do -the repayments made up ·to the completion point 
that then have to be deducted from the value of Community debts at 31  December 1998.  Failing any 
information that will  help us determine which factorwill predominate, we  shall just have  to  work on 
the  assumption  that  they  W\11  cancel  each  other Out;  but  this  implies. tO  accept  taking -a.-significant 
security margin, when presenting the outcome of the estimate. 
Out ofwhich 40 MEUR alre~dy s~cured by the July  t998 dc~i~ion, through interest from former -EDFs. 
13 How to deal with the countries -with which _cooperation is suspended is a difficult matter. 
It is hard to see how the Commission could commit itself to participating in the initiative 
in  respect of these countries unless cooperation. had  ~esumed
9 .  But we cannot rule out 
cooperation resuming with these "countries, even in the short term.  It would thus be wise 
to  include  the  potential  cost  of these  countries' becoming  eligible,  even  though  the 
Community's participation is  likely· to come much  later in  their case than  that of other 
multilateral creditors  .. 
On a more general note, the Community's participation in  the initiative will  be staggered 
over several years and its cost should be  viewed in  a timescale beyond the  provisional 
schedules  in Annex 3.  'Sine~ the  com.pletiott  point  will  henceforth  be  floating,  .the 
schedule 6f costs is ·more tentative than ever.  And even if some countries qualify earlier 
than predicted, it is. highly likely that this  will  be  counterbalanced by  others doing so 
later.  In  other words, the completion point may come more than  three years after the 
decision point.  Furthermore, in spite of the  'enhanced' treatment of arrears, a practical 
· risk remains, leaving aside geopolitical vicissitudes (some potential beneficiaries are  at 
war or politically very fragile) that many could fail  to reach their theoretical completion 
.  pqint dates on tinie, due to their incapacity to completely clear arrears. 
9.  This .is clear ifyou consider that reducing these countries' debt is  in  some  way.equivalent to giving 
them budgetary aid because it releases resources that would otherwide be devoted to debt servicing. 
14 ... 
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Table 4: Theoretical cost on the basis of average reductions (EUR) 
Total claims  of which special loans  arrears  Cost 
Nominal  NPV (1)  ·Nominal,·  NPV (1)'  Theoretical(4) 
(a)  (b)  0.41  x (a+b) 
Angola  2.107.7.10  1.676.812  0  0  97&.881  1.088.834 
Benin  15.885.850  10.264.038  2.796.735  1.591.466  4.208.256 
Burkina  45.536.152  32.201.534  11.629.399  6.930.186  10.477  13.206.925 . 
Burundi  54.201.588  32.300.611  42.689.409.  23.511.196  5.680.753  .  .' 15.572.359 
Cameroon  83.838.177  46.607.965  .  81.171.648  . 44.511.617  19.109.265 
CAR  13:916.421  10.790.989  4.454.571  2.595.257  .1.303.805  4.958.865 
Chad  8.142.926  5.824.017  5.331.606  3.601.913  30.913  2.400.521 
Congo  47.480.297  29.494.208  37.085.907  21.376.347  16.323.192  18.785.134 
Congo (DRC)  138.731.707  86.595.910  108.529.321  63.171:978  44.378.977  53.699.704 
Cote .d'Ivoire  82.059.529  50.724.419  66.246.525  38.505:539  11.400  20.801.686' 
Ethiopia  81.595.071  55.827.759 .  32.650.644  18.248.946  11-.000  . 22.893.891 
Ghana  47.409.459  .  33.638.739  29.437.474  18.416.877  '13.791.883 
Guinea  145.616.087  94.177.740  63.971.201  35:123.489  4.402.095  40.417.732 
Guinea-B.  5.610.600  5.610.600  902.140  .  2.670.223 
Guinea Eq.  4.403.616  3.346.207  2.602.258  2.438.871 
Guyana  5J.o96.680  29.316.417  43.174.114  23.072:409  12.019.731 
Kenya  144.989.180  95.773.260  87.432.193  51.447.287  1.596.039  39.921.413 
Liberia.  .6.400.453  3.877.330  5.828.853  3.305.730  1.286.313  2:117.094 
MadagaScar  49.098.029  32.068.513  30.170.338  16.967.571  13.148.090 
Malawi  89.070.772  57.431.596  31.088.890  17.418.722  23.733  23.556.685 
Mali  57.2~3.432  39.994.067  26.078.948  14.742.812  16.397.567 
Mauritania  59,223.561  . 40.951.983  ~8.176.598  15.692.864  16.790.313 
Mozambique  - 45.115.734  30.361.150  7.687.004  3.235.408  1.205.131  12.942.175 
Niger  ·34.272.625  21.140.877  24.256.962  13.051.789  .6.169.543  11.197.272 
Rwanda  .  35.652.2~  I  23.535.877  23.735.701  1·3.886. 726  7.073.035  12.549.654 
SaoT.&P.  1.103.932  941.410  0·  0  "385.978 
Senegal  93.860.217  58.439.695  . 66.365.451  37.302.249  24.762  23.970.427 
Sierra Leone  34.368.124  22.078.084  17.479.696  ·9.745.864  2.243.708  9.971.935 
Somalia  19.022.338  16.403.094  0  0  5.558.634  9.004.308 
· Sudan  37.676.792  30.105.038  12.471.873 .  7.878.929 . 23.340.592  21.912.708 
Tanzania  75.067.684.  51.887.432  36.289.449  22.940.210  569.059  21.507.161 
Togo  29.459:809  19.489.507  23.005.303  14.484,995  1.166.281  8.468.873 
Uganda (3)  41.664.619  36.089.050  . (4)  4.590.000 .  14.796.510 
Zambia·'  161.261.860  100.477.562  136.403.621  80.297.394  3.558.294  42.654.701· 
Total HC (2)  ;  1.542.271.432  1.009.753.649  894.067.425 516.006.485  4~.306.967  432.984.853  .  ...__ 
Total- SSL  1.779.103.698  1.159.058.028 1-067.338.707 616.461.110  100.265.476  •.  516.322.637 
Total  1.842.203.281. 1.209.443.489  1.085.639.433  627.645.769  130.451.015  549.356.747 
J 
(/) NPV=net present value at 4.5% on 1 January 1999. 
(2)  Total  HCS  =  Total excluding  countries ·with  which  cooperation  is  currently suspended:  Somalia,  Sudan and 
Liberia (SSL)  + DRC,  Niger,  Sierra Leone and Togo 
(3)  In the case of  Uganda .there are no more special loans because they were cancelled as part of  the· CommunitY's 
participation in the HI  PC initiative.  But,  applying the principle.of retroactivity, ·we  have added to  the  NPV oi  our 
claims the value these special loans had at the time-oftheir early repayment. 
(4)  Theoretical cost ojthe Community's participation applying a rate qf 41% to  the NPV of  the Community's claims 
· inCluding arrears.  · 
15 ANNEXES 
PRHNCH!P'ILJES GOVlERN«NG TlHllE COMMUNITY'S CONTRii8UTION 
The European Community shall fully participate in  the HIPC  in~tiative by assisting the 
countries which will qualify for this initiative, with a view to helping them reducing the 
net present  v~.1·.:e of their external financial obligations towards the Community. For this 
purpose,  th~  ·.:ornmunity  shali  make  available  grant  resources  to  be  utilised  by  the 
eligible  cotr:~~ries  to  meet  outstanding  debt  and  debt  service  obligations  towards  the 
Community. This assistance,  together with  reso1,1rces  provided by other creqitors, shall 
allow  the eligible countries  to  achieve  thei! country-specific  debt  sustainability target 
agreed within the framework of the HIPC initiative. 
This assistance referred shall  primarily be used by  the beneficiary countries to prepay 
outstanding special loans on a net present value. basis. If such action is not sufficient to 
attain the agreed level of. net present value debt reduction, the beneficiary country shaH 
use  the  allocated  grant -to  meet  ariy  outstanding  risk  capital  obligations  towards  the . 
Community. 
The  Commission · shall  take,  on  a  case-by-case  basis,  specific  decisions  providing 
assistance to each e}jgible ACP country,_ in  accordance with the rules and procedures laid 
down  in  Chapter IV  of the  Internal  Agreement.  The  Commission's  decision  on  the 
amount of assistance to be provided in each case shall allow for the necessary reduction 
in the net present value of that country's outstanding external financial obligations t9ward 
the Community and be  consis~ent with  the  HIPC  initiative methodology.  The country 
specific  decisions shall  also take into account the  structure of the  country's exposure · 
towards  the  Community,  the  desire  for administrative  simplicity  in  the  case-specific 
proposals chosen and the  need to ensure  an  equitable  and  fair  treatment  between  the 
eligibJe countries. Each country decision shall  make explicit( the modalities, terms and 
conditions for the implementation of_the 6
1
h July 1998 decision.  .  .  . 
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ANNEX6 
THE. LINK BETWEEN THE INITIATIVE AND POVERTY REDUCTION 
.  .  . 
The 07 did not rest on its laurels with a "deeper, broader and faster" initiative; it formally 
· requested the· IMf and the World Bank to give poverty reduction a much higher priority · 
iil their·.operations as well  as in the debt relief process.  The IMF's Enhanced Structural 
Adjustment FaCilities were explicitly mentioned..  -
.  . 
It is not yet quite clear·wnat the. operational response of the Bretton Woods institutions  . 
. will be but we are obviously heading for a radical change in the way structural adjustment 
programmes and policy framework papers are drawn up in future..  · 
/ 
/ 
This  strengthening· of  'the  soci~l  link .  is · in ·perfect  accord  with  the . Comrimnity's 
longstand~ng .concerns  and  with  the  Commission's  new  guidelines  for  structural 
adjustment.. '. ' 
.  I  .  . 
Indeed,  the  Community's  structural  adjustment  support programmes  were  designed to 
underpin  imd  expand the  social  dimension  to  programmes  negotiated  with  the  IMF. 
From the start the main aim was to secure social spending and ensure that adjustment was 
not  achieved  at  the  expenses  of social  stand~rds.  Another  aim  was  io  ext~nd .the· 
necessary process ofadjustment beyond-the purely monetary/budgetary sphere in order to 
make  the· public  administration  of sochil  sectors· more  effiCient.- in  ·other  words,  the 
Commission has always tried to emphasis the social dimension.of adjustment, even to the· 
extent of establishing its own forms of conditionality specific to  social considerations. 
Seen in this light, the G7's call is a respoJ1se to_ longstanding Community concerns.  · 
It  also  fits. in. perfectly  with  the  Commission's  new  structural  adjustment  guidelines. 
Discussions between.most major donors in  the SPkframework have revealed ever more 
clearly that a reform of conditionaJity has to be envisaged.  The. Commission has played 
in  key role in  this process:  A pilot scheme it carried out in  'B~rkina Faso produced· a 
.. number of tools· ·that  ~ould radicalJy change the  very concept of structural  adjustment 
programmes, above 'an by making'aid depend on performance indicators mainly-focused 
on the social needs of the population.·  '  I  . 
The Commission's last communication on  structu'fal  adjustment drew conclusions from· 
these efforts and it has already  been decided ·to start implementation, in Madagascar and· 
Senegal for example.  ·The~"basic idea Is to·conc~ntrate on  the results of·reforms rather 
than the reforms themselves.  This will meim  that:  (i) the focus of reform programmes · 
wi11  become .longer term; and (ii) the countries concerned ·will  have to  assume greater· · 
responsibility. for the choice of measures and the pace and .order of reforms; transparency.  .  . 
will  be  encouraged,  objectives  will. become  more  explicit  and ·programmes  will  be·:  :. · 
assessed. by results.  These, efforts will· have poverty reduction and institutional building: 
as· priority objectiyes.  .  1  · 
-l'he  Commission  .hopes. that  the  Bretton  Woods  institutions  wiJI.  draw- on  these 
experiences and come· up  with  an  operational  response  to  the  G7's -request  that  is  in 
accordance With SPA principles. 
.  . 
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